Dominic Williams has shared comments from renowned cryptographer Dan Boneh warning against rushing blockchain networks into post-quantum cryptography, highlighting the risks of making a rapid transition before new systems have been properly tested.
Williams posted Boneh’s remarks on X following a discussion about quantum computing, cryptography and the challenges facing blockchain networks as they prepare for future quantum threats.
Boneh argued that an aggressive move towards a post-quantum architecture by 2029 could be premature, warning that a rushed transition could introduce serious vulnerabilities.
“If you try to aggressively move to a postquantum architecture, like for example by 2029, I think that would be a mistake for the blockchain,” Boneh said. He added that a hasty transition could be more likely to cause a catastrophic bug than result in an attack by a quantum computer.
The comments come as blockchain developers and researchers consider how existing cryptographic systems should eventually be replaced with algorithms designed to withstand quantum attacks.
Boneh stressed that the quantum threat should not be ignored. He said the transition to post-quantum systems is likely to be difficult and take considerable time, meaning preparations need to begin early enough to allow the process to be carried out carefully.
The question is how much time the industry has. Boneh said he believes there are still many years before quantum computers are capable of posing a practical threat to current blockchain cryptography, with his own estimates extending beyond 2035. He acknowledged that other researchers take a more cautious position and favour earlier preparation.
Google’s security team has advocated a 2029 target for completing parts of the post-quantum transition. Boneh explained that this does not necessarily mean researchers expect a machine capable of breaking current cryptography to appear that year. Rather, an earlier deadline can provide additional time in case quantum computing develops faster than expected.
For blockchain networks, the timing presents two separate risks. Delaying the transition for too long could leave existing cryptographic systems exposed if quantum computing advances quickly. Moving too quickly, however, could introduce errors into software and infrastructure responsible for protecting users and assets.
Boneh’s warning focuses on the second risk. Replacing cryptographic systems across established networks requires extensive testing and coordination, and mistakes in the process could create vulnerabilities of their own.
The interview also examined estimates for the resources future quantum computers could require to attack current cryptographic systems. Boneh noted that estimates vary and that there is still debate around how quickly different quantum computing technologies will develop.
He compared the development of quantum computing with the history of aviation, pointing out that technological progress can accelerate once major engineering problems are solved. Boneh referred to the Wright brothers’ first flight in 1903 as an example of how quickly a technology can advance after an important breakthrough.
Boneh also pointed to recent progress in quantum error correction. He described Google’s 2024 Willow experiment, which demonstrated quantum error correction using 105 physical qubits, as an important development. He also referred to later research using neutral atoms to demonstrate quantum error correction techniques.
Despite those developments, Boneh questioned whether shorter migration deadlines would leave enough time for developers and users to make the transition safely. During the discussion, he described 2035 as a more reasonable deprecation target because it would give the industry greater time to prepare.
The discussion also considered alternative approaches that could provide additional protection while a broader transition takes place. One proposal involves a commit-delay-reveal mechanism, in which a commitment to a public key is placed on-chain before the actual public key is revealed.
Boneh described the approach as an interesting backup option, while noting that practical questions still need to be addressed around how such a system would operate.
Williams’ post brings attention to the broader issue of how blockchain networks should prepare for quantum computing without creating new security problems during the transition.
Boneh’s message is ultimately one of caution rather than inaction. Preparing for quantum threats may require years of work, but the process needs enough time for new cryptographic systems to be tested and deployed without introducing avoidable vulnerabilities.
The arrival date of a quantum computer capable of breaking widely used cryptography remains uncertain. The challenge for blockchain developers is preparing for that possibility while ensuring that the security measures introduced today do not create greater risks in the process.
Source: YouTube channel Isabel Foxen Duke
Dear Reader,
Ledger Life is an independent platform dedicated to covering the Internet Computer (ICP) ecosystem and beyond. We focus on real stories, builder updates, project launches, and the quiet innovations that often get missed.
We’re not backed by sponsors. We rely on readers like you.
If you find value in what we publish—whether it’s deep dives into dApps, explainers on decentralised tech, or just keeping track of what’s moving in Web3—please consider making a donation. It helps us cover costs, stay consistent, and remain truly independent.
Your support goes a long way.
🧠 ICP Principal: ins6i-d53ug-zxmgh-qvum3-r3pvl-ufcvu-bdyon-ovzdy-d26k3-lgq2v-3qe
🧾 ICP Address: f8deb966878f8b83204b251d5d799e0345ea72b8e62e8cf9da8d8830e1b3b05f
Every contribution helps keep the lights on, the stories flowing, and the crypto clutter out.
Thank you for reading, sharing, and being part of this experiment in decentralised media.
—Team Ledger Life
Community Discussion