Dominic Williams, the mind behind Internet Computer (ICP), recently sparked a governance debate on X. The question was straightforward: should users who delegate their votes to a named neuron pay 1% of their maturity gains to that neuron? The idea was to create an incentive structure that encourages the formation of named neurons, potentially improving ICP governance. The community was divided, with the final poll results showing 54.1% in favour and 45.9% against.
The discussion that followed reflected the complexity of implementing such a system. Some users saw this as a necessary step to strengthen ICP’s decentralised governance, while others were concerned about potential drawbacks. Responses ranged from enthusiastic support to cautious skepticism, highlighting a broader conversation about the role of incentives in governance structures.
A True World Order kept it simple: “No.” ICP Informer was in favour but felt 1% was too high. Muggzie suggested 0.25% instead, while Slomnim leaned towards 0.1%. The concern over neurons accumulating too much power was a recurring theme, with some suggesting that without a counterbalance, the system could lead to concentration of influence rather than decentralisation.
Lucas and ajki76, however, saw potential. They viewed the proposal as a way to encourage high-quality participation in governance, arguing that named neurons could take on an active role in shaping the network. Ajki76 pointed out that incentives could fund projects like CodeGov and encourage more decentralised teams to emerge. Saratoshi Nagamoto was even more direct, stating that this kind of incentive should have existed years ago. For them, expecting experts to dedicate time to reviewing proposals without compensation was unrealistic.
While the idea of rewarding named neurons has its supporters, concerns about unintended consequences persist. Richard Hery raised the point that if named neurons are compensated for voting on behalf of others, there should be accountability. If they fail to vote, there should be penalties. Wpb suggested that 1% might not be enough to attract the right experts for technical proposals, and that simply following DFINITY—the organisation behind ICP—would remain the default for most users unless there was a clear reason to do otherwise.
Mike Knows offered a different perspective, suggesting that a forced 1% fee might be too rigid. Instead, he proposed an optional tipping system where users could contribute based on the value they see in a neuron’s voting behaviour. This way, neurons that consistently provide insightful and well-reasoned votes would naturally attract more followers and support.
At the heart of the debate is a fundamental question about decentralised governance: should participation be incentivised through economic rewards, or should governance remain a voluntary, community-driven effort? On the one hand, incentives could encourage knowledgeable individuals to step up and take on the responsibility of guiding governance decisions. On the other hand, introducing financial rewards could shift the focus from community-driven decision-making to profit-driven behaviour, leading to potential gaming of the system.
The ICP community has long prided itself on being at the forefront of blockchain governance innovation. The Network Nervous System (NNS) allows token holders to participate in decision-making by staking ICP and voting on proposals. By following named neurons, less active participants can delegate their votes to trusted entities, ensuring that governance remains functional even for those who do not have the time or expertise to evaluate every proposal.
Williams’ proposal would add a financial layer to this structure, aiming to make named neurons more accountable and engaged. However, the pushback suggests that many within the community fear unintended consequences. One recurring concern is whether this would create an uneven playing field, where named neurons with the most followers gain disproportionate control over ICP’s direction.
There is also the issue of participation incentives. If named neurons become a source of passive income, there could be a rush to establish them, not necessarily by the most qualified individuals, but by those looking to farm rewards. This could lead to a scenario where named neurons prioritise maintaining their follower count over making well-informed governance decisions.
For some, a middle ground is worth exploring. A flexible range, as suggested by user radudaniel, could adjust the percentage based on specific criteria, allowing the system to balance incentives with fairness. A structured approach that ensures accountability while rewarding valuable contributions might ease concerns about potential manipulation.
Despite the divided opinions, the discussion itself highlights the evolving nature of blockchain governance. Unlike traditional governance models, decentralised systems must find ways to balance participation, incentives, and security without centralised oversight. ICP’s governance model has been widely regarded as an experiment in open decision-making, and this latest debate underscores how innovation in decentralised governance is an ongoing process rather than a static framework.
The responses from the community indicate that while there is interest in incentivising governance participation, the details matter. A rigid 1% fee may be too high for some, too low for others, and potentially problematic in terms of power dynamics. However, dismissing the idea entirely could mean missing an opportunity to encourage high-quality decision-making within ICP’s governance system.
As the community continues to weigh the pros and cons, the broader implications extend beyond ICP. Blockchain networks worldwide are grappling with similar questions. How can governance models encourage active participation without creating financial imbalances? How can systems prevent governance from becoming a pay-to-play model while still ensuring that experts contribute meaningfully?
Whatever direction ICP takes, this debate signals a growing recognition that decentralised governance must evolve. Whether through economic incentives, social mechanisms, or a hybrid approach, the need for engaged, informed governance is clear. If the system can strike the right balance, it could serve as a model for other blockchain projects navigating the same challenges.
For now, the discussion remains open-ended. The idea of rewarding named neurons has supporters and critics in equal measure, and finding a solution that satisfies both camps will require further refinement. What is certain, however, is that governance in blockchain networks is far from a solved problem. ICP’s experiment continues, and the outcome of this debate could shape its governance landscape for years to come.